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proved or alleged, in all cases actually the plaintiffs were totally
and permanently disabled. Nor did the fact that the mistaken
surgeon in the Stephenson case was of the plaintiff's choosing,
rather than of the defendant's as in the Morgan case,25 alter the
fact that an injured employee had suffered a latent or unknown
injury which from a practical point of view had not "manifested"
itself to the point where he could successfully prosecute a law-
suit. Evaluated as of the time of mistaken diagnosis, it is appar-
ent that the practicing attorney would have had to advise the
plaintiffs in the above cases that they had no cause of action for
compensation.
Since in no event may suit for disability resulting from latent
or unknown injuries be sustained more than two years from the
date of the accident,26 and since when suit is brought more than
one year after the injury or the last compensation payment, the
plaintiff will have the burden of proving the injury was not
"manifest" within the normal year; 2 it is felt that the defendant
will not be unduly prejudiced if the test of the Mottet case,
"When did the plaintiff's right and cause of action accrue, '28
should be interpreted to mean that the action had accrued when
as a practical matter the injury was made "manifest" by at least
one medical diagnosis that it was disabling and caused by the
accident.
Natural Obligations
POLICY UNDERLYING ARTICLES ON NATURAL OBLIGATIONS
If the reason for enacting a law is known, it is usually of
some assistance in determining the meaning of the written pro-
25. In the great majority of cases, the impecunious injured workman is
forced to rely on specialists furnished by defendant. But adopting this
narrow test of "whose" physician incorrectly diagnosed the injury appears to
lead to technicalistic inquiry regarding selection and perhaps qualification of
physicians not actually related to the primary question-when did the injury
actually "manifest" itself. Nor does this line of inquiry take into account the
slow-developing latent Injury discussed in note 24, supra.
26. See La. R.S. (1950) 23:1209, and particularly the amendment of La.
Act 29 of 1934; Arnold v. Solvay Process Co., 207 La. 8, 20 So. 2d 407 (1944);
Anderson v. Champagne, 8 So. 2d 373 (La. App. 1942); Kinder v. Lake Charles
Harbor and Terminal Dist., 31 So. 2d 498 (La. App. 1947); Cook v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 42 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1949).
27. Since the delay period under the compensation statute is considered
a peremption rather than a prescription, "the workman's cause of action is
absolutely and irrevocably destroyed if not seasonably exercised, Brister v.
Wray, 183 La. 562, 164 So. 415; Heard v. Receivers of Parker Gravel Co., 194
So. 142," Morgan v. Rust Engineering, 52 So. 2d 86, 89 (La. App. 1951).
28. 49 So. 2d 38, 40 (La. App. 1950).
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visions. The first step in understanding natural obligations, then,
is to determine the purpose of our code provisions concerning
them.
Although the French have only one provision on natural
obligations,' and a very short one, they have written an appre-
ciable amount on the subject. Why do natural obligations exist?
Pothier stated, "The only effect of the obligation merely natural,
is that when the debtor has voluntarily paid, the payment is
valid and cannot be recalled; because he had just cause to pay,
that is to say, to discharge his conscience. Therefore it cannot
be said that it was done without cause."'2 Toullier expressed
much the same idea.3 Marcad6 had this to say, "We say then
that the natural obligation is one which the legislature, after
denying to it ordinary efficacy because of the general presump-
tion of nonexistence or of invalidity, later sanctions because of
a voluntary performance, a voluntary novation or some other
act which reveals the real validity of the debt, proving to the
legislature that its presumption was erroneous for this particu-
lar case.' 4
Pothier and Toullier both show the logic of preventing the
repetition (recovery of payment) of that which has been paid
pursuant to a natural obligation because there is a valid cause
supporting the performance. Of course to say there is a valid
cause does not answer the question: Why is there a valid cause?
Marcad6 says that the law, for the protection of the particular
individual, makes certain obligations unenforceable. The law in
those instances presumes that there is some vice in the obliga-
tion. When the capable obligor voluntarily performs the obli-
1. Art. 1235, French Civil Code: "Tout palement suppose une dette: ce
qui a dtd payd sans 6tre d,&, est sujet 4 rdpdtition.
"La rdp~tition n'est pas admise d Z'dgard des obligations nature les qui
ont dMd volontairement acquittdes."
(Translation) "Every payment presupposes a debt; what has been paid
without having been due, is subject to be reclaimed.
"That cannot be reclaimed that has been voluntarily given in discharge
of a natural obligation."
2. 1 Pothier, Treatise on Obligations, § 195 (1802).
3. 3 Toullier, Droit Civil Francais, title III, § 386 (6 ed. 1846): "There then
is an effect common to all of the natural obligations; they prevent the repeti-
tion of that which has been paid. Why is that so? Because the payment has
not been made without having been due,... But if the law recognizes that a
debt exists, why does it refuse a right of action to the creditor, to compel the
debtor to perform? From reasons of prudence and of justice which it is
desirable to develop .. "
4. 4 Marcad6, Explication du Code Civil, Art. 1235, § 669 (7 ed. 1873).
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gation, that reveals to the law that it is wrong in that particu-
lar case.
Marcad6 gets down to the basic concept underlying natural
obligations: In certain instances the obligation of an individual
would have been valid but for the presumption of invalidity in
his favor; and if he proves by performance that the obligation
was in fact real and valid, he is bound because the lawmakers
were wrong in his particular case.
Do the Louisiana code articles on natural obligations track
this policy? Or does our law, in some instances, permit a single
individual to bind himself to the prejudice of the public as a
whole?
As WRITTEN, LOUISIANA's ARTICLES TRACK THAT POLICY
Article 1758, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, is the principal
provision on this subject:
"Natural Obligations are of four kinds:
"1. Such obligations as the law has rendered invalid for
the want of certain forms or for some reason of general
policy, but which are not in themselves immoral or unjust.
"2. Such as are made by persons having the discretion
necessary to enable them to contract, but who are yet ren-
dered incapable of doing so by some provision of law.
"3. When the action is barred by prescription, a natural
obligation still subsists, although the civil obligation is extin-
guished.
"4. There is also a natural obligation on those who
inherit an estate, either under a will or by legal inheritance,
to execute the donations or other dispositions which the
former owner had made, but which are defective for want
of form only."
This article is readily susceptible of an interpretation which
would follow the French theory. Surely the drafters must have
intended to follow that theory, for it would be indeed strange if
the legislature in one breath condemned the legal operation of
a type of transaction, thinking it bad for the general public, and
then in another breath gave it life through the natural obliga-
tion. If the transaction is against public interest before it is per-
formed, is there any reason for condoning it after performance?
1951] 81
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If that were so, the obligee would be allowed to benefit from his
illegal act, while the public would suffer from the countenancing
of such wrongdoing. The problem, then, is to construe our
statutory provisions on natural obligations to avoid that obvi-
ously unintended result, and to follow the theory underlying
natural obligations as set forth by Marcad6.
Obligations rendered invalid for want of certain forms or
for some reason of general policy, but which are not in them-
selves immoral or unjust, are natural obligations in Louisiana-
unless they are mere moral obligations. That statement comes
largely from Section 1 of Civil Code Article 1758. 5
Good argument can be made that the subsequent sections
are illustrations of the first by showing that Section 1, standing
alone, covers their provisions. Section 2 exists for reasons of
.general policy. Interdicts and minors are presumed to be with-
out the intelligence or experience to contract. The general policy
is to protect them as individuals. Their contracts are presumed
invalid. If upon coming of age, minors manifest an intention to
be bound, the law allows them to do so: when they are old
enough, they are free to waive their protection.
Particular forms, such as writings, are required for the
validity of certain contracts. For example, the law does not
think a man would casually promise to pay the debt of another;
and so, to be sure that he really intends to pay, the law requires
that the promise be in writing before it is binding.6 Clearly,
under our law, an oral promise would leave a natural obligation
to pay that debt, and any actual payment thereof would be bind-
ing. The obligor would have removed all doubt as to his inten-
tion to be bound by paying the debt. Of course, under Article
2134 of our code, even without an oral promise, the actual pay-
ment of another's debt would be effective.
Prescription covered by the illustration in Section 3 of
Article 1758 is troublesome. It is doubtful that the laws of pre-
scription were designed for the individual, solely. Surely there
must have been some public purpose in putting an end to con-
troversy over given subject matter after a stated length of time.
, Marcad6, however, shows very good personal reasons why
a legislature might enact prescription laws. He says that the
5. Art. 1758, La. Civil Code of 1870.
6. Art. 2278, La. Civil Code of 1870.
[VOL. XI
COMMENTS
explanation is a presumption of invalidity which the law attaches
to obligations long overdue for one or more of several reasons:
(1) that the long period of delay on the part of the creditor in
claiming his pay creates a presumption that the debt was not
meant to be serious or binding, (2) that the debt has been paid,
(3) that the creditor knew of the iniquitous foundation of his
title, or (4) that he had some other legitimate reason for not
enforcing the agreement. If the debtor, after entrenching him-
self behind the prescription bar, voluntarily fulfills the obliga-
tion, the law sees in that act the error of its presumption, and
bars all repetition.7
The option of performing or not performing according to
the wishes of the deceased a provided by the fourth illustration
in Article 1758 is certainly personal in nature, as it affects directly
only the individual heir or heirs.
As previously stated, Sections 2 and 3 of Article 1758 are
very plausibly illustrations, but it is not quite so clear that the
term "obligations" in Section 1 covers Section 4. However, it
was decided in the recent case of Breaux v. Breaux8 that "obli-
gations" in Section 1 includes the type mentioned in Section 4.
These last three sections, therefore, if illustrative of the con-
trolling Section 1, indicate that only those obligations which are
unenforceable for personal reasons can be natural obligations.
Perhaps that is the key to the meaning of the words "immoral
or unjust" as used in Section 1. Obligations which are "immoral
or unjust" are rendered invalid for reasons of public interest,
whereas those invalid because of policy are so for particular
protection.
But, argument might be made that Section 1 of Article 1758
does not include the other three sections. The effect of such a
finding upon the court's interpretation of Article 1758(1) should
also be examined.
Article 1758(1) speaks of obligations rendered invalid for
want of certain forms or for some reason of general policy. The
word invalid as used in the article does not necessarily cover
obligations rendered unenforceable through prescription.
Obligations such as substitutions and fidei commissa are pro-
7. 4 Marcad6, loc. cit. supra note 4.
8. Breaux v. Breaux, 51 So. 2d 73 (La. 1951).
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hibited from ever having effect as civil obligations; whereas a
debt which has prescribed was once, and still is, a valid civil
obligation, but is unenforceable. If the word invalid be viewed
in that light, it does not cover prescription in Section 3 of Article
1758. On the other hand, if Section 1 is a general article, the
word invalid can be construed broadly enough to include obli-
gations formerly valid but now unenforceable.
Section 1 speaks of obligations rendered invalid for certain
reasons. If the word invalid means null and void, then the words
obligations rendered would be unnecessary. The transaction or
situation never is an obligation at all, and there is no obligation
to render invalid. If the redactors had meant to say the obliga-
tion never existed, they could have used this language, "Actions
of parties which are held for some reason of general policy to
constitute no civil obligation at all, create natural obligations."
From that viewpoint, it seems that the word invalid includes the
word unenforceable.
Then in Section 3 of Article 1758 the code speaks of the civil
obligations as being extinguished by prescription rather than
made unenforceable. It seems that the word extinguished con-
notes a reduction to ashes, not merely a reduction to the status
of ineffectuality.
Section 4 of Article 1758 provides for the inheritance of a
natural obligation. The obligation which was reduced to the
status of a natural obligation because of formal omissions must
have been assumed by the deceased before his death. Its existence
or non-existence is still governed by Section 1.
However, Section 1 makes no mention of imposing a de-
ceased's natural obligation on his heirs, and possibly that one
portion of Section 4 is not covered by Article 1758 (1). It could
be argued that even without Section 4 the heirs would inherit the
natural obligations, since a succession includes not only the rights
but also the obligations of the deceased. 9
Even a showing that Article 1758 (1) does not include all the
other sections would not preclude a compliance with policy in
interpreting those sections. Section 1 is the only one which has
no illustration and it can be easily construed to follow the policy
behind natural obligations.
9. Art. 873, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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Requirements of form are imposed to insure real intent.
This is a protection accorded in the interest of the individual-
hence the resulting natural obligation when formal requirements
have not been met.
Obligations invalid for some reason of general policy include
only those invalid as insurance against individual harm, whereas
obligations immoral or unjust (which cannot be natural obliga-
tions) include those invalid in the interest of the public as a
whole.
In that view, a finding that Section 1 fails to cover the other
three sections would not disturb our courts in applying our
articles so as to follow the French theory. However, to find Sec-
tions 2, 3 and 4 to be illustrations demonstrates with more author-
ity that the intent was to adopt the logical French theory of
natural obligations.
COMPARISON OF THE JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY
The case of Breaux v. Breaux0 illustrates one position of the
jurisprudence. In that case, a fidei commissum, which is ex-
pressly forbidden by Article 1520 of the Civil Code, was declared
to create at least a natural obligation.
It is obvious that fidei commissa are forbidden in our civil
law property system for reasons of public interest-that interest
being the free alienation of land. That being so, the decision is
in conflict with the real purpose of prohibiting fidei commissa
and consequently deviates from the policy underlying the exist-
ence of natural obligations.
If usurious interest is charged for a loan, the agreement is
unenforceable; but it has been held consistently by our courts
that a loan involving usurious interest, although not enforceable,
creates a natural obligation." The correctness or incorrectness
of that holding depends upon the legislative reason for denounc-
ing usurious interest. The law in that instance is protecting the
individual obligor who finds himself in financial straits and at
the mercy of moneylenders. He does not have to pay, but if he
pays, then he alone is hurt. He has waived his protection. That
being so, the court has followed the policy of natural obligations
in holding such payments unrecoverable.
10. 51 So. 2d 73 (La. 1951).
11. Perrillat v. Puech, 2 La. 428 (1821); Rosenda v. Zabrinskie, 4 Rob. 493
(La. 1843).
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Another area of decisions concerns the difference between
moral obligations and other types of obligations. A purely moral
obligation clearly cannot be a natural obligation.
Article 1757 defines three types of obligations: The imperfect
or moral obligation, the natural obligation, and the perfect or
civil obligation. It expressly states that the duty of exercising
gratitude, charity and the other merely moral duties are imper-
fect obligations, and create no right of action, nor have any legal
operation. It speaks of natural obligations as being binding in
conscience and according to natural justice. This definition
seems to be applicable as well to moral obligations, and it would
be easy to confuse the two. It is evident, however, that the
redactors intended a distinction of some sort or they would not
have made three classifications. Even the draftsmen in their
notes to the projet of 182312 were careful to distinguish between
the natural obligation and the merely moral obligation. Natural
obligations were obviously not intended to include moral duties,
but the jurisprudence has given, in many instances, the same
effect to moral obligations as the code gives to natural obli-
gations.
In Banta v. McSpadden 3 an agreement for increase in the
contract price, although not supported by consideration, was
held to create a natural obligation. The obligor was not allowed
to recover the excess payments because the court found he had
paid pursuant to a natural obligation. The promise to pay addi-
tional compensation might be a legal obligation under the true
theory of civilian cause, but if a consideration theory is used (as
it has been by our courts), then there is no obligation at all
which could possibly create a natural obligation. It might be said
that there is an obligation with consideration lacking, but then
it would also be necessary to say that it is merely moral, since
it is binding only in a charitable sense.
12. 1 Louisiana Legal Archives, Projet of the Louisiana Civil Code of
1825, 226 (1937): "Although this kind of obligation [imperfect obligation]
has no legal effect whatever, its definition is introduced because It is fre-
quently referred to by commentators and sometime with such loose expres-
sions, as might induce a belief that it has the effect of a natural obligation,
unless the contrary were declared. In the common law of England, 'natural
affection' which is an imperfect obligation, Is a good consideration for a
conveyance. As we do not mean to sanction this principle, it was the more
necessary to declare It, because of the danger of introducing from the juris-
prudence of our sister states principles inconsistent with that of our own."
13. 147 La. 847, 86 So. 287 (1920).
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Factors and Traders Insurance Company v. The City of New
Orleans14 held that an unconstitutional tax imposes a natural
obligation to the extent that payment of it is not recoverable.
Cook v. City of Shreveport15 and Fusilier v. St. Landry Parish6
held an assessment on property to create a natural obligation
although not in proper form, In each of these cases involving
invalid taxes, the finding of a natural obligation was based on
the assumption that each person has an obligation to support the
city and pay his share of the city's expenses. But, unless there is
a legal duty to contribute to the welfare of others, that duty is
purely moral. It is not binding in conscience and according to
natural justice because the obligation is not of an onerous nature.
In Interstate Trust and Banking Company v. Irwin17 there
had been an impairment of capital stock by the directors. They
were under no legal obligation to make good that impairment.
The court held that there was a natural obligation on their part
to restore that amount which was sufficient consideration for a
promissory note issued by them in satisfaction of it. There was
no obligation stemming from an onerous transaction; in fact
there was probably no obligation of any sort. In United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Murphy'5 a contractor had
consented to allow the defendant to store liquor in the building
under construction. The liquor disappeared, and the contractor,
without being liable, paid the owner for the value of it. The
court held he could not recover what he had paid, since he had
done so in response to a natural obligation. Here again, unless
there was a legal duty to pay, there was merely a moral obliga-
tion. And, there seemingly would not be even a moral obliga-
tion unless the contractor thought himself wrong and could see
where he could have prevented the loss.
Notwithstanding the above cases, the court has followed
the mandate of the code in some cases-though not always using
the more desirable approach.
In Succession of Miller v. Manhattan Life Insurance Com-
pany'9 it was held that the obligation to provide for one's wife
upon one's death is a mere moral obligation of the husband. This
14. 25 La. Ann. 454 (1873).
15. 144 So. 145 (La. App. 1932).
16. 107 La. 221, 31 So. 678 (1902).
17. 138 La. 325, 70 So. 313 (1915).
18. 163 So. 724 (La. App. 1935).
19. 110 La. 651, 34 So. 723 (1903).
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was held however, not by applying the theory as set out by
Marcad6, but by holding that the obligation fell without the
exclusive provisions of Article 1758.
Succession of Burns20 correctly held that a dation en paiement
constitutes an extinguishment of the whole debt, and any dif-
ference between the value of the dation and the satisfied obliga-
tion is merely a moral obligation.
The following procedure is submitted for determining the
existence or non-existence of a natural obligation:
(1) Is it merely a moral obligation? If it is, that should end
the query. (2) If it is another type of obligation (one of an
onerous nature), then what was the purpose of the drafters in
rendering it unenforceable? If it was for the protection of the
public generally, that should be the end of the probe. If it was
intended to protect individual obligors, then it is a natural obli-
gation.
OTHER VIEWS CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OR NoN-ExisTENCE
OF NATURAL OBLIGATIONS
Although the procedure for identifying natural obligations
set forth above seems to be the one which would follow true
policy, other views have been suggested by the jurisprudence.
Some cases have been concerned with whether the four sec-
tions of Article 1758 are exclusive or illustrative. The cases of
Succession of Miller v. Manhattan Life Insurance Company2'
and Succession of Burns22 hold these sections to be distinct enu-
merations of the only four kinds of natural obligations and hold
all other obligations not civil to be merely moral.
The federal case of In re Atkins Estate23 holds them to be
mere illustrations of natural obligations. This case seems to say
that any obligation similar to the illustrations is a natural obli-
gation. The court went on to hold a clearly moral obligation to be
a natural obligation.
These cases failed to discuss the inclusiveness of Section 1
of Article 1758 or even the foundation of natural obligations.
True, there is some basis for confusion in the wording of Article
20. 199 La. 1081, 7 So. 2d 359 (1942).
21. 110 La. 651, 34 So. 723 (1903).
22. 199 La. 1081, 7 So. 2d 359 (1942).
23. 30 F. 2d 761 (5th Cir. 1929).
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1758, which begins as follows: "Natural obligations are of four
kinds. . . ." But since it seems the first section of that article
includes the three others, it must be the controlling section.
If the last three sections of Article 1758 illustrate the mean-
ing of the first section of that article, they are not exclusive.
Even a finding that Section 1 is not all-inclusive would not jus-
tify the line of approach adopted in these cases. Their procedure
should have been first to eliminate mere moral obligations, and
then to identify as natural obligations those rendered invalid for
individual protection.
The court in Commonwealth Finance Company v. Living-
ston24 submitted a formula for identifying natural obligations.
The judge, when speaking of the obligation to pay usurious
interest as being a natural obligation, said, "Were it one immoral
in itself, it would have fallen under the general declaration that
contracts contrary to bonos mores are void; and special legisla-
tion in regard to it, unnecessary." There the judge was speaking,
probably, of Articles 1892 and 1895 of the Civil Code:
"Article 1892: That is considered as morally impossible
which is forbidden by law, or contrary to morals. All con-
tracts having such an object are void."
"Article 1895: The cause is unlawful, when it is for-
bidden by law, when it is contra bonos mores or to public
order."
These two articles show expressly that no obligation con-
trary to morals or public order will be enforced, and it makes no
exception for natural obligations. Where the legislature has
specifically condemned certain activity, it has done so for reasons
of general policy, for otherwise the legislation would be useless-
there being a general provision condemning all immoral or unjust
contracts already in the code.
It is evident that if this theory is followed, there will be
no problem for the courts as to when there is and when there is
not an immoral or unjust obligation. But, to follow this theory
would be to say that even in instances where the purpose of the
legislature in invalidating certain obligations was public and
not special, a natural obligation would result. The case of Breaux
24. 12 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 1943).
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v. Breaux25 concerning prohibited fidei commissa is an example
of what would happen under this view.
EFFECTS OF NATURAL OBLIGATIONS
What is the significance of finding a natural obligation? That
question is answered in Article 1759 of the code.
"(1): No suit will lie to recover what has been paid, or
given in compliance with a natural obligation.
"(2): A natural obligation is a sufficient consideration
for a new contract."
The first section referring to the performance of an unenforce-
able natural obligation presents no problem. If there was a
natural obligation to perform, and the obligor has performed, he
cannot recover what he has paid or given by way of performance.
The second section is not so clear. By noting the words care-
fully, it is certain that for this section to be applicable there must
be a new contract which would be without consideration were it
not for the natural obligation supporting it.
The cases of White v. White26 and McCreight v. Leave12T
illustrate what seems to be a correct application of this section.
In the White case, there was a transfer of real estate by private
act. This private act of sale, unless supported by consideration,
would have been a donation and not being in the proper form
would have been void. But, because the land was sold for the
consideration of a natural obligation, it was a good sale. In the
McCreight case, it was held error to exclude evidence showing
indebtedness due by the plaintiffs to establish a natural obliga-
tion as consideration for the deed, notwithstanding the indebted-
ness was barred by prescription, such consideration being suffi-
cient to support the deed.
In the above cases there was found a natural obligation; we
are not here concerned with the correctness of that finding; we
are concerned only with the effect of such a finding. The natural
obligations and the contracts which they supported emanated
from different sources. The supported contracts, sales in these
cases, were new contracts as required by Article 1759 (2).
25. 51 So. 2d 73 (1951).
26. 7 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 1942).
27. 156 La. 156, 100 So. 289 (1924).
[VOL. XII
1951] COMMENTS 91
These two cases might be found to fall within Article 1759,
Section 1. This would be so if the transfer of land was not a new
contract, but was in fact a dation en paiement of the natural
obligation to pay the prescribed debt. In this sense, the sale of
the property would not be a contract at all, there being no
promise to do or give anything. The payment of a debt would
discharge and not create a contract, and the fact that payment
was made with property would not change the basic concept.
In another sense there is a contract in such cases resulting from
the concurrence of the will of the obligee in accepting the dation
en paiement.
The cases of Rosenda v. Zabrinskie28 and Reid v. Duncan29
bring out the nebulous part of Article 1759(2). If one promise
is void because of general policy, there remains a natural obliga-
tion to perform. That natural obligation according to Article
1759 (2) is sufficient consideration for a new contract. Does that
mean that a subsequent promise to do the same thing, since it is
supported by the natural obligation of the first, would be enforce-
able? That argument was advanced in the two above cases with
regard to the promise to pay usurious interest (which is held to
create a natural obligation). In those cases, it was held that the
subsequent promise was nothing but a renewal of the old or first
promise, and as such was not a new contract as required by
Article 1759 (2).' And there is no reason why the court could not
have said that, even though the first promise was sufficient con-
sideration for the second and new contract, the second contract
was still one to pay usurious interest, as such, infected with the
same vice as the first promise to pay.30 The court could have
28. 4 Rob. 493 (La. 1843).
29, 1 La. Ann. 265 (1846).
30. 3 Toullier, Droit Civil Francais, title III, § 396 (6 ed. 1846): "Nous
avons dit que, dans le droit romain, l'obligation naturelle resultant d'un pacte
simple pouvaitdtre drigde en obligation civile, par un autre pacte simple
appeld pactum constitutae pecuniae. C'dtait une convention faite pour
corroborer la premiere, et par laquelle on promettait de l'acquitter dans un
temps, donn6. Quoique cette seconde promesse fat faite par un pacte simple,
non revdtu de la stipulation, les prdteurs, par un retour a l'iqut naturelle,
donnaient une action contre le ddbiteur d'assez mauvaise foi pour manquer
a une obligation ansi rdi~rde, quoniam grave est fidem fallere, Leg. 1, ff de
const. pecun., 18, 5.
"Si le pacte constitutae pecuniae dtait fait pour corroborrer une obligation
civile, il en rtsultait une nouvelle action en faveur du crdancier, qui avait un
grand intdrt d'en avoir plusieurs, sous une jurisprudence hdriss~e de subtili-
tds, sourtout d l'dgard des actions. Aujourd'hui que toutes les actions sont
de bonne oi, et que les pactes simples sont obligatoires, le pacte constitutae
pecuniae est sans utilitM (1), et hors d'usage, lorsque le terme pour acquitter
l'obligation est ddtermin6. Une obligation nulle, faute d'une formalitd pre-
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interpreted the term "sufficient consideration" to mean that a
second promise to pay the usurious interest would be binding
because the obligor, after having been given one chance to escape
liability because of a presumption of invalidity in his favor, had
demonstrated his real intent by promising a second time. If that
view be taken, the only question is whether or not there is a
new contract.
The following hypothetical case may be posed: Suppose A,
a real estate broker, operates without a license. The law expressly
states that he cannot recover his commissions from owners for
whom he sells when he is not properly licensed. A sells property
for B, and of course B does not have to pay the commission; but
B decides to pay him because of his good work. B therefore prom-
ises A that he will pay him for selling the land. Would this
second promise of B's be enforceable? There might be some
question as to the purpose of the enactment of the licensing
statutes, but it seems likely that the policy behind them is the
protection of individual owners of property against unqualified
brokers. That being so, there is little doubt that such a promise
to a broker would create a natural obligation. But would the
second promise be a new contract, or would it be merely a
renewal of the old contract? It could be argued that the second
promise is not a promise to pay a broker's commission contained
in a listing agreement, but a separate, new promise to pay a man
for good services rendered. In that light, the promise would be
enforceable.
It could be argued on the other side that this is merely a
renewal of the promise contained in the old listing agreement,
and as such is not new; also it is still a promise to pay an
unlicensed broker's commission which is not enforceable. This
hypothetical case is hard to distinguish from the usurious inter-
est cases, but there is one difference; that is, that in the case of
usurious interest, the second promise is still a promise to pay a
higher percentage than the law allows and as such is still a con-
tract to pay usurious interest. In the real estate case, the second
promise is not made to the man as a broker, but an individual
who has rendered valuable services.
8crite par la loi civile, ne serait point corroborde par une seconde qui contien-
drait les memes vices. Nous en avons donn6 un example dans la ratification
d'une dohation entre vifs, nulle par le vice de forme (1339)."
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CONCLUSION
Moral obligations are not natural obligations. The term
"natural obligations" encompasses only those obligations of an
onerous nature, as contra-distinguished from mere moral obli-
gations. Of those kinds of obligations, only the ones made
unenforceable for particular protection are natural obligations.
Performance of a natural obligation cannot be recovered. The
meaning of Article 1759(2) is confused because of the uncer-
tainty surrounding the question of when there is a mere renewal
and when there is a new contract.
Ernest G. LaFleur, Jr.
